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This essay contends that the constitutional system of checks and balances distorts
democratic deliberation about issues of national security by integrating questions of
security within a broader policy agenda. The relationship between security and other
issues creates incentives that make it less likely that officials will provide people
adequate information about the risks facing the nation and will, instead, encourage them
to view security in terms of the policy package associated with competing security
policies.
More particularly, the essay uses the fight against terrorism to illustrate how
checks and balances distorts deliberation about security issues. It identifies political
dynamics that would explain three shortcomings of public discussion of President Bush’s
security policies: (1) rather than specify Iraq’s relationship to Islamic terrorism, President
Bush has appealed to September 11th and the possibility of a nuclear Iraq to assert the
high probability of more attacks with the potential to kill many more people; (2) his
opponents have sought to undercut public support for the Iraqi war by emphasizing the
high costs of the policy without addressing adequately Iraq’s relationship to Islamic
terrorism; and (3) both President Bush and his opponents assume that the fight against
terrorism warrants a considerable investment without clarifying the likelihood and
magnitude of future attacks.
In the aftermath of September 11th, Democrats had to maintain a patriotic silence
in order to sustain the appearance of bipartisan unity. This is not to say that Democrats
did not want to support the President as he defended the nation from a clear attack. But
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they also recognized that the political strength that presidents gain when the nation unites
has significant consequences for the broader partisan agenda, because presidents can use
this strength to advance controversial programs that have little to do with the defense of
the nation. And just as presidents might fight unjust wars to secure partisan ends, their
opponents might challenge just wars for the same reason. We are all sensitive to the
“wag the dog” problem, but it is easy to forget that tails wag in two directions.
Cynicism is bipartisan: if there is temptation for one side to engage in cynical
behavior, the other side will have incentive to anticipate such behavior and engage in
cynical behavior of its own. The current political context invites such cynicism; it is easy
to believe that (a) President Bush fought a war in Iraq in order to sustain the popularity he
gained in responding to the September 11th attacks and (b) Democrats are attacking his
policies in order to reverse the partisan losses of the last six years and without regard to
the dangers of Islamic terrorism. In so doing, we ignore important possibilities.
President Bush might have had good—non partisan—reasons for fighting the war, even if
the war also served partisan purposes, and his opponents might be right in concluding the
Iraqi war is a bad policy, even if they do so for partisan reasons.
Cynicism, then, does more than express suspicion of why an official pursued what
seems to be a bad policy, it also indicates a deeper problem. Putting motives aside, we do
not have adequate information to assess security threats, and the constitutional system of
checks and balances gives elected officials various incentives to focus on the partisan
implications of security policy. As a consequence, people tend to assess security policy
in light of its costs, especially the lost opportunity to pursue other political goods, and
without an adequate understanding of the threats themselves.
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This is not to say that people will value these goods more than national security.
We will see that although there are circumstances in which officials have reason to
emphasize the high costs of security policy, there are also circumstances in which they
have reason to emphasize, though not explicate, security threats.
To begin, we should not be surprised that the system of checks and balances
encourages people to consider security in relation to other political goods. It is a
structure of government that uses competition among factional interests to identify public
goods that transcend those interests.1 Each institution represents different constituencies
and has various capabilities that allow it to block policies that conflict with the interests
of these constituencies. Public goods, according to this view, are those that a broad
consensus of people believe consistent with their other interests.
This system does not work well with security issues, however. People lack
information about the nature and scope of the threats they face, information they must
have if they are to effectively weigh security against other interests they might advance.
Indeed, there would be no reason to put partisan differences aside and unite behind
presidents when they defended the country, if we knew that those presidents were
pursuing security policies that were against our interests.
More particularly, given that people have limited information about the dangers
they face, officials will want to avoid the perception that their policies put the nation at
risk. If we imagine the set of all possible policy packages that officials might advance,
each official has reason to choose from the subset of packages that include a security
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Because political parties have become the primary means for advancing factional interests, I do not
distinguish between factions and partisan interests. The problem I identify is a consequence of how the
Constitution deals with factions and would continue to be a problem even if there were no political parties.
It is the design of the Constitution that gives officials incentive to build policy coalitions across issues.
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component that will make at least a majority of people feel protected. Officials will have
incentive to distinguish themselves by (1) convincing people that their opponents’
policies are outside of the subset of acceptable packages2; (2) favoring packages with
security policies that advance the interests of important constituencies3; and (3) favoring
packages with non-security policies that advance the interests of such constituencies.
These incentives create various political dynamics that influence the type of
information people receive about threats the nation faces and tend to distort public
deliberation about national security. This essay will consider these dynamics in three
different contexts: (1) the shorter term when the nation faces immediate threats; (2) an
intermediate period in which those threats recede; and (3) the longer term in which
people consider security policies more generally.

I. The Shorter Term: Presidents Incentives in Responding to Immediate Threats
In the face of immediate threats,4 presidents are uniquely situated to defend the
nation. Presidents have better information about the dangers people face and the
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Ronald Reagan, for example, was able to exploit the public’s perception that the nation’s defenses were in
decline, even as President Carter maintained military expenditures at a level that matched a high rate of
inflation. O’Strom and Mara, APSR 819, 838-39 (1986); Hartley and Russet, Public Opinion and the
Common Defense 86 APSR 905 (1992); Bartels, Reagan Defense Build Up 85 APSR 459, 461 (1991).
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During the early years of the Cold War, for example, Republicans and Democrats divided on the proper
balance between nuclear and conventional forces, and this division corresponded to the interests of
important constituencies. Benjamin Fordham, Democratic Politics, International Pressure, and the
Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending 64 J. POLITICS 63, 65-67; Jacobs and Page, Who
Influences U.S. Foreign Policy 99APSR 107, 121 (2005) Jacobs and Page suggests that internationally
oriented business leaders have had considerable influence on American Foreign Policy.
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John Mueller specified criteria for identifying events associated with rallying effects. They had to be
international, involve the President, directly and had to be “specific, dramatic and sharply focused.”
Mueller, WAR PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC POLICY p. 209 (1973) For purposes of my analysis, there
need not be a clear line to mark when an immediate threat begins to recede. The distinction is meant to
identify conditions in which openly partisan criticisms of the president are likely to be efficacious.

5
resources necessary to respond. This would explain why people rally behind presidents
who combat such dangers.5
Although presidents gain short term popularity in responding to immediate
dangers, this popularity is fleeting.6 Sometimes the dangers themselves are fleeting and
partisanship reemerges as ordinary politics returns.7 In this circumstance, the popularity
presidents gain in defeating a threat is not enough to sustain a presidency.8 Without the
stimulus of an immediate threat, security becomes a more general concern. People will
vote against presidents that they believe not up to the task of defending the nation but will
otherwise assess presidents in light of broader political considerations, ensuring that a
president’s partisan agenda will have great consequence for his or her political fortunes.9
On the other hand, presidents sometimes respond to immediate dangers that
recede without being eliminated. Ordinary politics returns as people become inured to
lingering dangers, at which point there is likely to be partisan debate about particular
policies that address those dangers. Presidents have reason to anticipate these debates—
presidents lose popularity as they pursue extended conflicts—and seek the partisan
support that will help them to sustain their policies.10
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While presidents have reason to formulate security policies with an eye to their
partisan agenda, this does not mean that they exaggerate or manufacture threats in order
to attract partisan support. But these incentives will lead presidents to take actions that
make it difficult for people to fully understand the threats that face the nation. Consider
two tendencies that would follow from these incentives.
First, rather than explain why a policy is appropriate given the nature or scope of
a threat, presidents have reason to use the existence of the threat as a justification for the
policy.11 Actual justifications would legitimate public discussion of that policy. And
while presidents can control such discussion in the shorter term, when a united people
will punish openly partisan behavior, over time a president’s justification is likely to
become the subject of partisan debate.12 As the threat recedes, a president’s opponents
can distinguish themselves on security issues by attacking particular security policies.
And detailed policy justifications expose presidents to these attacks.
Moreover, presidents who anticipate the return of partisan politics will want to
avoid wasting political resources on a policy that will already have broad support. They
would, instead, use these resources to build alliances that would help them to stay in
office and increase their power. By advancing a partisan agenda, they give people a
greater stake in their presidencies, making it easier to sustain their policies.
11

Some events seem to speak for themselves. The Soviet Union’s explosion of a nuclear bomb, Berlin
blockade and invasion of Czechoslovakia hardened public opinion in favor of the Cold War. And later
events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Hostage Crisis created a similar
sentiment for strengthening national defenses. Page and Shapiro Foreign Policy and the Public 1988 J.
CONF. RESOLUTION 211, 225.
12
Posner and Vermeule identify strategies that a well meaning Executive can use to increase their
credibility when they act in the name of national security. “The Credible Executive” But there is a deeper
structural problem in that security policies will be associated with broader policy agenda whether or not
those policies are well motivated, and people will have an incentive to assess those policies in partisan
terms, even if they believe them to be well motivated. As a consequence, presidents who are well
motivated still have reason to invest political resources in building partisan support for their policies rather
than in convincing people of their good intentions.
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And this suggests a second tendency that distorts public understanding of threats
to the national security. As a president’s security policy becomes part of a broader policy
agenda, it becomes difficult for people to disentangle the policy package and consider the
a particular security policy on its own merits, a difficulty that is compounded when a
president has not provided an adequate policy justification. This is not to say that
partisanship will make it impossible for people to detect flawed or failed security
policies.13 But their stake in a president’s success will lead them to be more favorably
disposed toward those policies14 than they otherwise would or in some circumstances
support those policies in order to preserve the president’s strength to fight other partisan
battles.
President Bush has used each of these strategies to sustain support for the Iraqi
war. Rather than discuss the nature of the threat posed by terrorism and Iraq’s
relationship to that threat, he sought to associate people’s recent experience of a terrorist
attack with an unstable dictator who was either pursuing or likely to pursue weapons of
mass destruction. He had reason to pursue this course, given the nature of the evidence
necessary to justify the Iraqi war and the weakened position of his political opponents.
The link between Iraq and the war on terrorism seems to follow from inferences
we might draw about (1) the relationship of instability in the Middle East to Islamic
terrorism, (2) the relationship of Iraq to instability in the Middle East, and (3) the
relationship of Iraq to Islamic terrorism. The justification for war in Iraq, according to
this view, would depend on how these relationships influence the physical and economic
13

People also can switch their partisan affiliation in response to changes in how they perceive the parties.
Brody and Rothenberg, “The Instability of Partisanship” 18 BRITISH J. POL SCIENCE 1988
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There is some evidence that partisans will switch positions as their parties do, especially when the issues
are difficult. Page and Shapiro 1988 pp. 231-32 (?) Gerber and Jackson, 87 APSR 639, 654 (1993);
Murray 1993 J.CONF. RESOLUTION (?)
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security of the United States. A reasonable assessment would require a detailed
understanding of how Saddam Hussein’s regime contributed to Middle Eastern
instability, including what we might have expected from an Iraq that while significantly
weakened had begun to escape the shackles put in place after the first Iraqi war.15
More significantly, we should recall that in the aftermath of September 11th the
Democrats were in a weak position to challenge the war on terrorism and that the best
they could do was to question the strategies used to prosecute the war. By offering a
detailed policy justification, President Bush would have invited public discussion that
would make his policy a legitimate subject of partisan debate.16 And such a debate would
have diverted the resources he used to advance the interests of important constituencies,
including tax cuts, laws favorable to the energy industry and the appointment of
conservative judges. These constituencies played an important role in his reelection and
have subsequently helped him to sustain what has become an unpopular policy.

II. The Intermediate Period: Partisanship Returns in the Wake of a Receding Threat
Although there will be a different political dynamic as an immediate threat
recedes and the danger becomes more speculative, it is a dynamic that reinforces the two
problems we associated with the earlier time; (1) security policies are not adequately
justified, and (2) people have reason to consider them as part of a broader policy package.
The absence of an adequate justification will lead people to focus on the costs of security
policies both in lives and resources. Moreover, by linking particular security policies to a
15

And there were such assessments at the start of the war Pollock book?
Gary Jacobson has commented on unusually deep partisan divides over both the Iraqi war and the Bush
presidency, although the divide narrowed considerably after the September 11th attacks. President Bush,
therefore, had reason to frame the policy as a response to terrorism so as to dampen partisan criticism and
to a considerable extent this tact succeeded.
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partisan agenda, presidents invite people to consider those policies in light of their
opportunity costs17—whether the resources invested in those policies would be better
invested elsewhere.18 Countervailing political forces will move the status quo towards a
policy package that encompass a broader range of interests as those left out of incumbent
president’s coalition pursue policies that take better account of their interests.19
A president’s opponents will challenge particular security policies in a way that
would not be tolerated while the nation was in immediate danger, and many people will
assess these challenges in partisan terms.20 While those with a stake in the president’s
success will be more receptive to his or her arguments or will have some reason to favor
policies they would otherwise believe unjustified, there is likely to be a large number of
people who would prefer a different policy package. The reason is that by initiating
security policy, presidents form narrower coalitions than would have arisen if the same
policy had been initiated by Congress.
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Recall that the system of checks and balances is committed to broad based policy
making. The legislative process reflects this commitment in that it contains various veto
points at which people can block policies that threaten their interests, thus broadening
public support for government policy. Presidents avoid this process when they initiate
security policy and thereby sever the question of whether to pursue a policy from the
question of how to pay for it. Legislators, as a consequence, do not have an opportunity
to assess a president’s policy in light of its effect on the budget of competing programs
that are important to particular constituencies. Given that legislation tends to require
larger majorities than it takes to elect a president, it is likely that Congress would not
have approved a president’s security policy unless it had been part of a different policy
package. And once people have a clearer sense of both the costs of a security policy and
also the distribution of those costs, namely the government programs that have suffered
budget cuts in order to pay for the policy, there is likely to be a coalition of interests to
defeat the policy package that contains the president’s security policy.21
It would seem that in these circumstances presidents would have incentive to
bring forth more information to justify their policies. But such information is likely to be
less effective rhetorically than a renewed appeal to people’s fleeting memory of a past but
very real danger. The problem is that any justification would be speculative in that the
danger might never arise again or that it will have disproportionate affect on some people
over others—younger people, for example would be far more likely to suffer than older
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In addition Mueller cites, including 1970 minorities coalition thesis to explain why Presidents popularity
declines in time. Bound to alienate constituents on important issues another way of saying that there will
always be a coalition to defeat the current one . Kernell 1978 (time variable conflating particular actions
that lose support)
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people. By contrast, a president’s opponents can point to the immediate costs of the
policies that combat that danger.
Consider an analogous case: the government’s difficulty in responding to
impending environmental catastrophes. In the absence of immediate experience, it is
hard for people to grasp good evidence about the likelihood of disaster, especially when
many people have reason to think they can avoid the danger. And though immediate
weather events—such as a recent trend of stronger and more frequent storms—have
limited evidentiary value, they are more likely to convince people of the dangers of
global warming than scientific accounts of a looming environmental calamity, and this
continues to be the case even as the memories of those events fade. The problem is
further complicated, because those with interests opposed to remedial policies have both
incentive and ability to make the costs of those policies clear.
This is not to say that a president’s policy is deficient because it lacks the broader
support demanded by the system of checks and balances. Indeed, our instinct to unite
behind presidents in the face of danger suggests that we value security more than other
goods and thus have reason to consider security policy in isolation from these partisan
interests. And one reason to do so is that our deliberations about security become
distorted when people receive better information about the costs of particular policies
than the dangers those policies seek to address.
We see this problem as Democrats challenge President Bush’s policy in Iraq.
Recall that the September 11th attacks placed the Democrats in the position of a loyal
opposition. To regain power, they would have to wait for the President to make a
mistake in prosecuting the war or for the return of ordinary politics, a time when they
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could win elections by distinguishing themselves from Republicans on issues not related
to security. President Bush, therefore, had reason to avoid a detailed justification for the
Iraqi war. Such a justification would legitimate partisan discussion of security policy and
thereby divert political resources from partisan ends that would, over the longer term,
strengthen his presidency and thus help sustain a broader political agenda that included
the Iraqi policy itself.
Time has proved that President Bush needed partisan support to sustain what has
been a costly policy. Democrats have made gains by emphasizing these costs, and we see
that to a considerable extent people’s assessment of the policy corresponds to their
partisan preferences.22 More significantly, while the 2006 election looks as if it will mark
the beginning of the end of the Iraqi war and perhaps also reverse whatever partisan
advantage President Bush was able to secure from the policy, we should consider how
much our deliberations have been shaped by the costs of the policy and how little
attention we pay to the relationship among events in Iraq, instability in the Middle East,
and the threat of Islamic terrorism.
It would seem that President Bush would have had greater incentive to justify the
Iraqi war as the costs of his policy mounted, but this is not the case. Whether or not we
believe that the Iraqi war is good policy, we can see why President Bush would avoid
making his justification a subject for debate. Our struggles with environmental policy
suggest that convincing evidence has much less influence when processed through a
partisan filter, and, by its nature, the evidence that would support the Iraqi war is much
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more speculative than the evidence about environmental dangers. Rather than
probabilities derived from facts, we are faced with competing interpretations of history.
Both Republicans and Democrats are likely to view the justification through
partisan lenses, given that they are interested interpreters of such evidence. Democrats,
however, have an advantage in making their case to non-partisans; they can point to high
costs that are readily apparent, while Republicans can only offer theoretical conclusions
about highly contestable evidence. Moreover, the September 11th attacks continue to be a
significant if receding presence in the public psyche. President Bush seems to have
decided to avoid a debate that will bring added attention to a costly policy. This strategy
will prove sound, if divisions among the electorate and the partisan gains of the past six
years help him to sustain the policy.

III. The Longer Term: Overinvestment in General Security Policy
The Democrats have challenged the Iraqi war by pointing to the high costs of
President Bush’s policy. By contrast, they have done comparatively little to challenge
the President’s decision to fight a war against terrorism, and the lack of discussion of this
more general policy commitment is noteworthy. It is indicative of a third political
dynamic that characterizes longer term security policy; checks and balances create an
institutional bias that leads partisans of all stripes to spend too much on national security.
In the absence of information about the immediate costs of a particular security
policy, it becomes harder for people to see the trade offs between the resources allocated
to security and those allocated to other political goods. People know that savings from
security can be used to advance other interests, but they disagree about how to distribute
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the savings from security cuts. More significantly, they also believe that that the overall
budget contains programs that should be cut before security, though they disagree about
which programs to cut.
As a consequence, proponents of defense spending can focus the debate on the
narrower question of which programs should be cut before security and thereby avoid the
broader question of whether we are spending too much on security, whether we would be
better off redistributing money from security to all other programs.23 This strategy is
made more effective, because politicians can use real if uncertain threats to reinforce
people’s tendency towards caution and can point to the absence of an immediate threat to
prove the efficacy of existing security policy.
Moreover, both presidents and legislators have incentive to overvalue security.
Presidents have institutional reasons to be risk averse in that they play a primary role in
the formulation and implementation of security policies and that voters hold them
responsible for those policies.24 While legislators will also seek to avoid a reputation for
being weak on security,25 they also have a partisan reasons for supporting the security
choices that presidents make. Presidents have considerable influence over the national
policy agenda and can link their security policies to partisan goods that have great
significance to legislators’ reelection.
Over time, therefore, the dynamics of elections should create upward pressure on
security spending.26 We have seen that presidents have incentive to choose from the set
23
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of policy packages that will not make them vulnerable to attack for being weak on
security. But that set is likely to be fluid, given that there will be times in which
presidential candidates can identify plausible threats to justify policy packages weighted
more heavily to security. In so doing, they place their opponents in the difficult position
of having to prove the absence of danger or risk being perceived as weak on security.
While these opponents are likely to reject the new policy package, they will want to
undercut the distinction that the other candidates are trying to draw and will do so by
advancing policies that invest more in security than the policies they otherwise would
have favored.27 At this point, presidents will have to choose from a set of policy
packages that is more heavily weighted to security than the original set.
Consider again how deliberations about the Iraqi war have been characterized by
almost no detailed discussion of the nature of the threat terrorism poses or how it
compares to other dangers the government might address.28 In challenging President
Bush’s policies, the Democrats have questioned the Iraqi War and some limited costs
associated with the broader war against terrorism, such as particular policies relating to
domestic surveillance. But Democrats have shown little inclination to question the need
for a war on terrorism as a response to the September 11th attack, even though this is a
war that will entail significant costs for the foreseeable future.29
It would be surprising if either Democrats or Republicans did so. In challenging
the war on terrorism, politicians would have to make contestable and speculative
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arguments. In so doing, they would expose themselves to opponents who will be eager to
emphasize the high costs of terrorism to a risk averse electorate. Indeed, we already
know that they will draw on the example of September 11th to do so and will say next to
nothing about why they think a similar or more dangerous attack is likely. Moreover,
given the likelihood that there will be terrorists attacks regardless of the security policy
officials implement, all officials have an incentive to appear aggressive in combating
terrorism, if only to inoculate themselves against future attacks from partisan opponents.
There will always be ambitious politicians willing to reinforce people’s fears, by
encouraging doubt about the adequacy of existing security measures. As a consequence,
we should expect officials to remain bullish on the war on terrorism. But it will be
surprising if they justify the investment.
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